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The Predatory State and Radical Politics: The Case of 
the Philippines 
 
Christopher Ryan Baquero Maboloc Ateneo de Davao University, Manila 
Abstract 
This paper examines why the radical approach to politics of President Rodrigo Duterte, 
halfway into his term, has not overcome the predatory nature of the Philippine state. The 
predatory nature of the state implies that politics in the country is still defined by vested 
interests. The struggle of the Filipino is largely due to the structural nature of the 
injustices suffered by the country. Duterte’s brand of politics is antagonistic. The 
president is a polarizing figure. Despite the declaration that he will punish corrupt 
officials, traditional politicians and elite clans continue to rule the land with impunity. 
The country’s political ills are actually systemic. Elitism is rooted in colonial history that 
is perpetuated by an inept bureaucracy. It will be argued that the strong resolve and 
charisma of a leader is inadequate to remedy the troubles in fledgling democracies such as 
the Philippines. 
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Introduction  
What is the fundamental task of 
every Filipino president? There can only 
be one answer – to change the political 
landscape in Philippine society. In order 
to do so, Filipinos have to become mature 
in terms of their choices. Yet, it is wrong 
to blame them for their situation. The 
problems of the Philippine state are 
structural in character. Political overlords 
control the lives of the people and 
manipulate political exercises to 
perpetuate themselves into power. As a 
result, millions have not escaped the 
poverty trap and continue to suffer from 
the discomfort of an inept bureaucracy. In 
2016, Rodrigo Duterte was elected by an 
overwhelming majority of the electorate 
hoping that the radical approach of the 
tough-talking politician will alter the 
fortunes of the Filipino people. In this new 
study, the author uses the interpretive 
method in textual analysis, using texts 
and materials culled from various sources, 
including books, recent newspaper 
articles, and scholarly works on the 
subject matter at hand. 
Democratic Paralysis in the Predatory 
State  
John Sidel’s Capital, Coercion, and 
Crime: Bossism in the Philippines explains 
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that bossism is the “interlocking and 
multitier directorate of bosses who use 
their control over the state apparatus to 
exploit the archipelago’s human and 
natural resources.” (Sidel, 1999) The roots 
of bossism in the Philippines can be traced 
to the American period. The Western 
colonizers put the coercive and extractive 
power of the state into the hands of the 
traditional ruling class. Elected officials, 
untrained in the sophistication of 
democratic governance, found at their 
absolute disposal the opportunity to 
manipulate the affairs of the state. The 
systemic exploitation of the Filipino was 
entrenched in the politics practiced in the 
country. The landed class enforced the 
monopolization of enterprises. 
Bureaucrats became tools of corrupt rule. 
This is apparent in provinces and cities 
that are dominated by political dynasties. 
The Philippine state even after the People 
Power Revolt of 1986 is a paralyzed form 
of democracy that has been subordinated 
to the vested interests of traditional 
politicians and corporate masters. 
Since the time of President Manuel 
L. Quezon, the traditional politician 
remains to be the boss in Philippine 
society. Bosses, Sidel (1999) argues, “are 
predatory power brokers who achieve 
monopolistic control over both human 
and economic resources within given 
territorial jurisdictions or bailiwicks.” 
Business interests and the politics of 
money mix up in the Philippines. The 
businessman, who often monopolizes the 
trading of goods of a locality controlled by 
a few, finances the politician because the 
former expects the latter to protect his 
profit-making ventures. This scheme is 
mutually beneficial for both but is 
dangerous to the basic welfare of the 
people. Nathan Quimpo (2005) thinks that 
“bossism reflects a common conjuncture 
in state formation and capitalist 
development: the superimposition of the 
trappings of formal electoral democracy 
upon a state apparatus at an early stage of 
capital accumulation.” State formation in 
the Philippines is the conspiracy between 
two evil masterminds: the traditional 
politician and the oligarchs who continue 
to subjugate, abuse and ultimately exploit 
the Filipino to the hilt. 
Predation in the Philippine state is 
about the use of machinations to control 
the population. Understanding the 
political consciousness of the poor matters 
in this regard. But one cannot blame the 
masses. The poor have been forced into 
circumstances that influence the way they 
think about and choose a candidate. This 
explains why the masses still elect corrupt 
politicians. The traditional politician has 
successfully portrayed that for the masa 
(people), it does not really matter who 
rules them. This fatalistic attitude is a 
consequence of latent as well as obvious 
forms of maneuvering from the barangay 
up to the provincial level. Party bosses 
hire starlets and celebrities, transforming 
election campaigns into entertainment 
shows and public spectacles. At the root 
cause of it all is the politics of money. 
In Sidel’s theory, the state is a 
Mafia-like enterprise that exploits with 
impunity the natural and human resource 
of a political jurisdiction. The predatory 
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state feeds on the weaknesses of the poor, 
many of whom lack formal education. 
Having no decent means of living, the 
poor succumbs to dependency. Political 
leaders organize the poor in urban centers 
as well as in rural areas into groups. 
Leaders sell their votes wholesale. Folks 
are made to attend fake seminars and 
mass rallies. Even senior citizens are paid 
to distribute election materials. The poor 
see this as means to make money during 
elections. The electorate will ignore 
candidates who do not provide them with 
food packs or cash. In the end, the damage 
that a predatory state makes is 
irreparable. The people are used as means 
to perpetrate a systemic exploitation that 
is seemingly legitimized by dirty electoral 
exercises. The politics of money paralyzes 
democracy by influencing the outcomes of 
elections. 
Quimpo (2009) explains that in a 
predatory regime, “clientelism and 
patronage give way to pervasive 
corruption, a systematic plunder of 
government resources and the rapid 
corrosion of public institutions into tools 
for predation.” Public officials only 
approve business applications after they 
are bribed with shares of stocks. Corrupt 
politicians also have a say on who must 
get the licenses in legal gambling like the 
Small-Town Lottery. Developers of 
subdivisions are forced to give padanlug 
(grease money) to have their land 
conversion requests approved. In 
addition, there are politicians who are 
engaged in smuggling and drug 
trafficking. The individuals who conspire 
in these evil schemes – businessmen, local 
police, and public officials – divide the 
loot. They do not only paralyze the 
bureaucracy; their wicked ways also 
destroy the future of the nation. 
Culture and context will always 
matter. (Paredes, 2002) For example, the 
value of “utang na loob” (debt of 
gratitude) is negative when applied in the 
political arena. According to Oona 
Thommes Paredes (2002), “in the case of 
the Philippines, it is clear that certain 
cultural factors configure social and 
political relations between bosses and 
their supporters, as well as within a given 
network of bosses.” People see their 
political overlords as their first resort 
when they need money during town 
celebrations, weddings, or baptism. In 
return, their sense of gratitude will 
translate into votes. Paredes (2002) says 
that for Sidel, “electoral democracy and 
bossism go hand-in-hand.” For this 
reason, the reality of bossism is inevitable 
in impoverished societies like the 
Philippines. Since the electorate is 
conditioned to think that they owe 
something to the traditional politician, the 
latter thinks that the people are no longer 
entitled to anything. The boss dictates not 
only the rules of the game but also the 
outcomes of the lives of the people. 
Sidel’s analysis is important in 
understanding the type of leadership that 
usurps the state. The failure of any 
government to protect the welfare of its 
citizens may be due to the incompetence 
of technocrats but the root of the problem 
is dynastic rule. In the Philippines, 169 or 
84% of the 200 elected members of 
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Congress belong to pre-1972 ruling 
families. (Tadem & Tadem, 2016) Senator 
Manny Pacquiao, a Filipino boxing hero, 
thinks that “too much democracy is bad 
for the Philippines” (Elemia, 2019). 
Pacquiao, who is also building his own 
dynastic rule in Sarangani Province, has 
the highest number of recorded absences 
in the Senate (Talabong, 2019). The effect 
of dynasties is apparent – persistent 
poverty. The monopoly of power means 
that people do not have the means to 
voice out concerns. As a result, the interest 
of the public is not attended to by their 
government officials. By limiting the field 
of candidates to a few, dominant family, 
national progress stagnates. But the bosses 
– mayors, governors, including the 
president – become richer. 
President Duterte is a polarizing 
figure. His brand of politics is disruptive. 
But to put things into context, it is 
important to revisit the real reason why 
Filipinos put Duterte in Malacañang. D. S. 
Panarina presents a positive view on the 
Philippine president. Panarina (2017) 
observes that “Duterte made a strategic 
decision to start his domestic policy with 
reestablishment of law and order using 
rather authoritarian and militaristic 
methods, but at the same time rapidly 
earned him the abovementioned trust of 
ordinary people.” Duterte does not seem 
to mind the opinion of the West against 
him. A realist by heart, Duterte’s pivot to 
China and Russia presumably is for the 
sake of national interest, arguing that the 
US is meddling over his domestic policies, 
especially his war on drugs. Panarina 
(2017) believes that despite the president’s 
“lack of diplomacy, Duterte clearly 
comprehends the biggest dangers for his 
nation (potential or existing) and acts 
accordingly.” In fact, Duterte’s timid yet 
realist position on the West Philippine Sea 
issue is simply misunderstood. While 
some accuse him of selling the country off 
to China, the president is clear in saying 
that he only wants to protect national 
interest by not instigating any potential 
military conflict against China.  
That Duterte is an autocrat is 
debatable, but what seems clear is that he 
has the tendency to ignore public morals. 
To his critics, he sometimes speaks like a 
thug (Wood, 2017). Indeed, in his three 
years in office, critics and admirers alike 
would remember his rape joke, his cursing 
of Pope Francis and President Barack 
Obama, and above all else, his decision to 
allow the burial of the late strongman 
Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga 
Bayani. The burial happened at early 
dawn. It was a strategy that caught his 
critics by surprise. But as of the moment, 
protests on Duterte’s decision has since 
subsided. But while the president is 
projected negatively, he has also achieved 
unique accomplishments through his 
maverick ways. Duterte solved the “laglag 
bala” racket at the Ninoy Aquino 
International Airport, he made Lucio 
Tan’s Philippine Airlines pay its seven 
billion-peso debt, and the Bangsamoro 
Organic Law (BOL) was passed by both 
houses of Congress and ratified in a 
referendum.  
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The Pejorative Term “Buang”  
Senator Ronald dela Rosa, who led 
Duterte’s “War on Drugs” then as head of 
the Philippine National Police, was 
criticized for describing the death of Kyla 
Ulpina, a three-year old girl killed in a 
drug operation as “collateral damage” 
(Aurelio, 2019). Police operatives alleged 
that the girl was used by his father as a 
shield, although the report of Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) indicates that the 
latter was actually unarmed. The human 
rights group said that the girl is a victim 
of Duterte’s drug war (Conde, 2019). The 
excessive use of force is the object of 
criticism. When Duterte mentioned that 
he will protect law enforcers from legal 
suits emanating from anti-drug 
operations, critics said it gave the police a 
feeling of impunity. When the “right to 
due process” was raised by the Catholic 
Church and the country’s constitutionally 
independent Human Rights Commission, 
Duterte rebuffed his critics, saying that 
“your concern is human rights, mine is 
human lives” (Villamor, 2018). Critics 
were alarmed that murder has become a 
national policy. The problem of the 
president’s statement is that human rights 
and human life are not mutually 
exclusive. To protect human lives, one 
needs to value human rights.  
But one needs to ask, what is the 
reason for the huge support for Duterte’s 
violent anti-drug war? Arguably, it lies in 
the prejudice against drug pushers and 
drug users. Drug addicts, in the mind of 
the Philippine president, is “buang” 
(crazy). Calling a person “buang” is 
reflective of the kind of bias that is still 
prevalent in Philippine society. Someone 
who is “buang” is not only an irrational 
man. The same is also considered as 
undesirable in society. This prejudice 
might have come from the fact that there 
are insane persons roaming the streets, the 
ones called “taong grasa”. They have been 
abandoned by their families and are left to 
scavenge for any leftover in garbage bins. 
This reminds us of the politics of 
exclusion, in which the bad elements of 
society are to be separated from the good 
ones. Duterte characteristically portrayed 
the drug addict and drug dealer as vicious 
villains. For the president, both should be 
punished. Steffen Jensen and Karl Hapal 
(2018) in researching their paper, 
interviewed a law enforcement officer 
who put it this way: “The people we put 
down are not people anymore. They are 
demons that need to be removed from the 
face of the earth. We the police are like 
angels that battle those demons. We know 
what is right and we know that what 
those criminals do is not right.” 
According to HRW, the Philippine 
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) has 
recorded 4,948 deaths of suspected drug 
users and pushers in police operations 
since July 1, 2016 up to September 30, 
2018. The same report indicates that 
22,983 such deaths have been classified as 
homicides under investigation (Human 
Rights Watch, 2019). Some critics say that 
Duterte only targets small drug dealers, 
although during the Senatorial Debate, 
then candidate Dela Rosa fired back at 
critics in defense of the president saying 
that police anti-drug operations have 
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neutralized ‘big fishes’ like the Parojinogs 
of Ozamiz City and Albuera Mayor 
Rolando Espinosa, the father of the 
suspected drug lord Kerwin Espinosa. 
However, in a survey conducted by the 
Social Weather Stations in December 2018, 
it was shown that 78% of the public are 
worried about extra-judicial killings. In 
the same survey, 50% of the victims of 
summary executions in the country 
belong to poor households. Only 3% come 
from wealthy families (Rappler, 2019). 
However, the Filipino public has not 
shown any massive indignation against 
the president’s war on drugs. Even the 
members of the clergy are divided. Daniel 
Franklin Pilario (2017) says that it is 
because “the official political machine 
officially extols the success of the anti-
drug project.” Beyond this observation, 
however, is the feeling that the war on 
drugs has made many communities safe 
from criminal elements. 
Duterte’s mystique was reinforced 
when he met with the alleged drug 
kingpin Peter Lim of Cebu City. The 
president has warned that he would kill 
the Chinese businessman. So far, that has 
not happened. For some critics, Duterte’s 
war on drugs is morally troubling. They 
argue that it is an extermination program 
(Esmaquel, 2017). Violence is at the heart 
of this anti-drug campaign. For three 
years, scores of drug suspects have been 
killed and then marked with a cardboard, 
“Wag Tularan” (Do not follow). The 
context is clear. It warns the public to keep 
themselves away from illegal drugs. 
Critics contend that Duterte’s radical 
approach revolves around a world of 
crime and punishment. For historian 
Vicente Rafael (2016), the president’s 
violent ways are nothing but a 
manifestation of a principle of vengeance. 
He writes that “for Duterte and the rest 
like him, justice means revenge.” Rafael 
argues that the president is using his 
campaign against criminality as an excuse 
for his dictatorial infatuations.  
Randy David (2016) says that such 
phenomenon of blind obedience and 
ultra-fanaticism is “pure theater – a 
sensual experience rather than the rational 
application of ideas to society’s 
problems.” David says that Duterte is 
using the coercive power of the state 
against his dissenters. The sociologist 
thinks that Duterte is the “incarnation of a 
style of governance enabled by the public’s 
faith in the capacity of a tough-talking, 
willful, and unorthodox leader to carry out 
drastic actions to solve the nation’s 
persistent problems” (David, 2017). He 
calls such phenomenon, “Dutertismo”. 
Benjiemen Labastin (2018) explains that the 
idea “could be read as a prophetic 
warning to remind the people not to be 
trapped again with the sweet promises of 
authoritarianism as an easy path to solve 
the country’s woes.” David believes that 
Duterte’s type of governance is nothing 
short of a demagoguery. Labastin says 
that for David, the president is subverting 
the sovereignty of the Filipino people 
(West Philippine Sea issue) and 
bastardizing its democratic processes 
(right to due process of drug suspects), 
suggesting that such an attitude is a 
characteristic of leaders who pay no 
respect to the rule of law. 
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The paralysis of state and society 
in the Philippines is manifest in the deaths 
of thousands in the war on drugs. It is no 
secret that the violent means employed by 
the state through law enforcers have 
resulted in the murder of innocent lives. 
The reason is simple. Police operatives are 
human beings who make mistakes. They 
can also be abusive and so by giving them 
the absolute blanket of authority to kill 
every drug suspect, such an approach will 
have far reaching implications that can 
destroy Filipino families. Duterte, in this 
sense, is not only ruining Philippine 
democracy, but is also obliterating the 
future of children whose parents have not 
been given the chance to reform. The 
death of thousands is a disturbing reality. 
In this regard, critics contend that the 
president is a danger to Philippine society 
(Panarina, 2017). 
Politics as Usual: The Corrupt Ways of 
Post-Colonial Philippines 
According to Michael Cullinane 
(2003), “bureaucrats who were appointed 
to implement the new laws more often 
than not abused them.” The ilustrados 
aggrandized themselves. Moreover, the 
same cabals impoverished the Filipino 
people. The incompetent brand of service 
rendered to the people would be carried 
over decades thereafter. At the heart of the 
ilustrado rule is centralized governance. 
The Spanish authorities instituted a 
system to administer the islands more 
effectively, although the main motive of 
the friars were land and the subjugation of 
the local population. When Spain left the 
country, the Americans maintained the 
system and distributed the resources in 
the country to the elites in Manila. Since 
the provincial elites were beholden to the 
national leadership and the oligarchs in 
the capital, the American imperialists 
knew that all they had to do was keep 
close ties with the ruling class in Manila. 
Paul Hutchcroft and Joel 
Rocamora (2003) explains that “the logic 
of Philippine politics became driven to a 
considerable extent by the politics of 
patronage and the division of the spoils 
among the elite and the expansion of the 
quantity of spoils available to the elite as a 
whole.” The EDSA People Power failed to 
emancipate the Filipino from oligarchic 
rule. The elites used their status to 
influence policy. Post-EDSA II 
governments promised to serve the 
Filipino under the pretext of moral 
reform, but the predatory culture of 
corruption continued to stifle progress 
and governance. The elites in the 
provinces too wielded great power and 
influence. The Philippine state had no real 
means to control them. Instead, national 
leaders used local dynasts to perpetuate 
their positions. In return, the bosses in the 
poor provinces persisted in their greedy 
and corrupt ways. While relative 
economic growth was achieved during 
past administrations after EDSA II, this 
has not trickled down to poor households.  
The ascent of Duterte to power can 
be attributed to the discontent of the 
Filipino. Duterte succeeded in projecting 
himself as the right candidate for the job 
by building that image of an alternative to 
a lousy leadership. But Duterte is not 
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someone who can be exempted from the 
predatory nature of the Philippine state. 
While Davao City can be showcased as a 
success story, this success is not about 
good governance, but the kind of 
discipline imposed on the people. It is the 
personality of Duterte, more than his 
principle of governance, which charmed 
the Filipino electorate. This makes 
manifest what Patricio Abinales and 
Donna Amoroso (2005) calls “the slide of 
Philippine society from institutionalism 
into pure politics.” 
Elite democracy only privileges the 
few. Its rent-seeking ways only benefit 
those at the top. In such kind of politics, 
extraction and exclusion characterize the 
system. The Filipino, as a result, finds 
himself serving two overlords – Chinese-
Filipino tycoons and dynasts. Chinese 
migrants effectively integrated themselves 
into Philippine society. While they were 
unable to do so in Malaysia or Indonesia, 
it was a different case for the Philippines 
(Kusaka, 2017). Filipinos of Chinese 
descent control 60% of the non-land 
capital in the Philippines. Chinese tycoons 
own the biggest banks, manufacturing 
firms, and malls. They have shares in 
infrastructure, mining, and in utility firms. 
A rising oligarch, Dennis Uy is of Chinese-
Filipino blood. Injap Sia, an emerging 
tycoon who at a very young age became a 
billionaire, is also of Chinese descent. This 
is not to diminish the huge contribution of 
Chinese Filipinos to the development of 
the country. What we this claim intends to 
show is that opportunities have been 
scarce for the ordinary Filipino but not for 
those who live in gated communities. 
The silencing of the voices from 
the margins, including the media, the 
perpetuation of a neo-colonial regime, and 
the presence of a semi-feudal socio-
economic order, reveal the predatory 
nature of the Philippine state. The real 
problem of politics in the Philippines is 
that it has been reduced into the pursuit of 
personal interests. President Benigno 
Aquino III campaigned on the promise 
that he would reform Philippine society 
by running after corrupt government 
officials. Yet, as his administration started 
its mission, it has become clear that he 
was only interested in prosecuting 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. 
Aquino’s government was also embroiled 
in many controversies, the most 
prominent of which was the Development 
Acceleration Program (DAP) where then 
Budget Secretary Florencio Abad was 
accused of re-aligning surplus funds from 
the national budget into discretionary 
projects without the proper authorization 
from Congress as mandated by the 
Philippine Constitution. 
Three years into the Duterte 
presidency, it seems that it is “politics as 
usual” for corrupt politicians. Duterte 
understands what power means. For this 
reason, he has to make alliances with 
dynasts and the traditional politicians in 
pursuit of all his agenda. The senatorial 
elections of 2019 proved that the president 
still has that charm, although some in the 
political opposition would like to 
insinuate that the exercise was rigged. 
Clearly, the election of his Special 
Assistant Christopher Lawrence “Bong” 
Go is a testament of the high trust and 
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confidence of the majority of the people 
on President Duterte. The Liberal Party’s 
slate of senatorial candidates known as 
“Otso Diretso” that included the 
incumbent Senator Bam Aquino and 
former Department of the Interior and 
Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas, 
all lost in the election. The midterm 
election was simply a vote of confidence 
for Duterte. 
The LP slate represented the elite. 
But the defeat of “Otso Diretso” does not 
also mean the defeat of the ilustrado class. 
In fact, many of the candidates who won 
in the 2019 midterm election are political 
butterflies or turncoats. The majority of 
the congressmen and senators who are 
now allied with Duterte formerly 
belonged to the Liberal Party. For obvious 
reasons, politicians change loyalties for 
political expediency. So, despite the strong 
pronouncement of the president against 
corruption, it still widespread. Indeed, 
traditional politicians have positioned 
themselves since time immemorial with 
the ruling party to secure their place in the 
hierarchy and the necessary funding for 
pet their projects. Infrastructure projects 
are a potential source of kickbacks that 
range from 10 to 30 per cent. As a 
consequence, it is the people who suffer. 
In fact, it can be said that Duterte has not 
dismantled elite rule in the country. 
The reason why the predatory 
nature of the Philippine state remains is 
apparent. Corruption in the country is 
systemic. Unless the people mature in 
politics, there is no way to overhaul the 
elitist nature of Philippine democracy. The 
cycle continues because no single man can 
reform this system. Duterte himself knows 
that he has to play his cards well and 
dance with the wolves if he wants his 
agenda to push through. Change does not 
happen overnight, not even after three 
years. The political machine has 
embedded itself and the traditional ways 
of politics have penetrated the deepest 
roots of Philippine society like a cancer. 
While roads and bridges have been built 
in the countryside, poor houses occupy 
the landscape. Without jobs, there is no 
way for the Filipino to overcome his 
situation. Politicians give people a reason 
to hope, but it is our choice of principles 
that would matter in the end. The 
traditional politician has none.  
Moral Politics and the Radical President 
Agonistic politics is grounded in 
the idea of struggle. Society is not a 
homogenous set of identities. Antonio 
Gramsci’s constructivist view of the world 
tells us that human society has no intrinsic 
nature. What becomes of society is a 
product of hegemonic relations. This is the 
case for the Philippines. For instance, the 
ownership of vast landholdings by the 
ruling class during the colonial period 
defined the economic as well as the social 
landscape of the country. There remains to 
be hierarchical differences that influence 
how citizens relate to each other 
politically. In fact, it is the case to this day. 
As such, after Duterte won, big 
businessmen from Manila came to see him 
at his temporary office in Davao. They all 
wanted a big part of the action. But more 
than anything else, they simply needed 
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assurance and security for their 
businesses. 
The thing that people call 
consensus is no more than an ordering of 
power. Prior to Duterte, those in the 
capital dictated what was to become of the 
country. The idea of dialogue is nothing 
but a disguise for the selfish motives of 
the powerful. The anti-establishment 
strategy that Duterte employs is a type of 
antagonism. This type of conflict comes in 
various forms – Manila versus Mindanao, 
the educated versus the unschooled, the 
rich versus the masa (people) (Kusaka, 
2017). This is even clear in the reaction of 
Mayor Sara Duterte, the president’s 
daughter, when she reacted against the 
use of the song “Manila” during the 
Opening Ceremony of the 2019 
SEAGAMES. Yet. It can be said that 
Duterte’s rule is not defined by class 
struggle. It is more of a disruptive type of 
politics that uses to the fullest extent the 
divisive situations of people in order to 
control the state and its political 
machinery. 
The daily life of the people cannot 
be separated from the dimension of their 
communitarian soul. Nation-building as 
the slow unfolding of history in political 
movements is something that the atomism 
of most liberals has never paid attention 
to. Radical democracy maintains that the 
political cannot be limited to rational 
discourse because doing so is to tie 
politics to the narrow limits of logic and 
explanation (Mouffe, 1995). Indeed, the 
notion of identity cannot be established 
without the reality of difference. Any form 
of rational consensus ignores the value of 
passion in the political. Indeed, the 
normal way of doing things will not work 
in a society like the Philippines where the 
situation is abnormal. The clamor for 
someone who is strong, even this leader 
will bypass legal processes, becomes 
inevitable.  
Thus, with his aggressive and 
adversarial style of leadership, Duterte 
may have inaugurated radical democracy 
in the country. The moral vision of politics 
in the Third World is that ideal of 
establishing an egalitarian society. There 
is a true concern for the equal rights of the 
poor and the disadvantaged who have 
been perpetually oppressed. The reason 
for every desire for radical reform is that 
social inequalities are unjustified. Duterte 
has always considered himself a 
progressive. He has endured having 
embraced this principle, even with all the 
political divergences, many breaking 
points, and splits in the country after 
EDSA I. But as a “contested democracy”, 
to use Quimpo’s term, Duterte’s style is of 
course subject to the judgment of history. 
It must not be forgotten that the kind of 
society Filipinos have is not a matter of 
fate but a conscious act on the part of their 
bosses to exploit the powerless. 
In modern democracies, it is 
unexpected for a provincial politician to 
seize power from the ruling class of 
traditional political families. Duterte is the 
product of a society that has failed on its 
democratic experiments, the latest of 
which was grounded on Aquino’s moral 
recovery model of reform. Even the 
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development-oriented model of President 
Arroyo did not work in the country. 
Arroyo’s corruption plagued 
administration gave legitimacy to 
someone who represents change. 
President Aquino became that person 
when his mother, the former president, 
died. The second Aquino administration 
began with a great promise, only to suffer 
from the same malady the Arroyo 
administration had. While President 
Aquino may not be corrupt, he was not 
emulated by his fellow politicians as an 
example. Aquino was a weak leader. But 
this weakness, it can be presumed, is not 
just a personality thing. It bespeaks of the 
lack of concern of the ruling elite beyond 
their own kind. 
It appears that most Filipinos are 
not against shortcuts if the same can bring 
actual results and immediate benefits. The 
only problem is that the masses look up to 
their idols like some kind of a demi-god 
who will solve their problems. Moral 
development, in this respect, is farthest 
from the mind of the electorate. What 
brings a poor man to City Hall is not the 
desire to live the good life. Rather, it is 
about his daily survival, the problem that 
he is embroiled in, and that hope that the 
politician-patron will be able to give him 
money to free him from his troubles. A 
poor man is not in search of virtue when it 
all comes to politics. He is looking for 
attention from the politician who is also a 
caring father figure, one who is expected 
to provide solutions to impossible 
problems. Technical expertise may be 
crucial to the success of the state, but the 
most immediate concern of the poor 
Filipino is really the way out of his 
desperate situation. 
The above attitude is ingrained in 
Filipino political culture. Politics has 
become some form of ritual for people 
wherein they worship their political idol. 
Duterte is a political paradox. Many of his 
critics say that he is no more than a 
dictator who use his colorful language to 
hide his true motives and ambitions of 
power. It is possible, for instance, that his 
daughter will run in the 2022 presidential 
elections given the weakness and lack of 
unity of his political opponents. But to his 
supporters, Duterte’s maverick ways can 
help a society find the means and 
measures to achieve change. While the 
antagonistic nature of his politics will 
require people to go beyond the limits of 
rational discourse, Duterte thinks that a 
politician must distinguish his politics 
from morality to realize the meaning of 
the common good. Liberalism provides a 
straight path in achieving the ideals of 
democracy through discussion and 
dialogue. But the dynamics in Philippine 
society, given the hegemonic relations 
rooted in an oppressive colonial past, 
leads one to think that Duterte’s radical 
kind of leadership is necessary. 
Limiting politics to the binaries of 
morality misses the important aspect of 
decision making which is crucial in 
realizing change. This should not mean 
that people must reject morality. It only 
means that citizens have to make the 
distinction when it comes to the political. 
For Carl Schmitt, politics refers to 
institutions designed to govern society. 
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The political, on the other hand, is about 
relations of power. Indeed, it is argued 
that the concept of a perfect consensus is 
an illusion. The same is utopian and 
unrealistic. Despite the criticisms, Duterte 
is using well the card of hegemony to his 
advantage. This is not to suggest that he 
has the wrong motives in doing so. But 
what is obvious is that he has been able to 
consolidate his powers to protect himself 
from any threat from those who may have 
plans to challenge his position, including 
the military. 
Radical politics may characterize 
the situation of the Filipino’s post-colonial 
struggle. But the ordinary Filipino still 
finds himself voiceless in the affairs of the 
state. This colonial legacy appears to give 
some semblance of legitimacy to Duterte’s 
radical leadership. But the death of elitism 
is temporary and the reason is often 
obvious. Duterte has not implemented 
principle-based reforms to change the 
socio-political establishment. In fact, the 
president is aware that the same cabals in 
Congress are still there. He has to depend 
on the normal state of things in order to 
pursue his agenda. The president also 
knows that he has to deal with the 
oligarchy and the traditional elites in 
Philippine society. There’s the rub. 
Conclusion 
The history of the Filipino people 
is generally presented through the eyes of 
Manila. Such shatters the voices in the 
margins of Philippine society. The radical 
approach of Duterte is no less than his 
way of challenging the status quo. Duterte 
as a father-figure knows how important it 
is for him to bring out the agenda of the 
masses. On the other hand, as the boss he 
also realizes the pragmatic reality of 
Philippine politics. The only way forward, 
in this regard, is for the president to have 
the radical resolve to face the problems 
that bedevil the nation. The norm is for an 
elected leader to conform to tradition and 
protocol that befit the highest position of 
the land. But Duterte shows that in his 
case, it is the other way around. The 
weakness of Philippine institutions 
manifests the political and moral divide in 
society. Institutional decisions are based 
on the choices made by people in 
authority in whom the electorate entrust 
political power. As such, it matters how 
people choose their leaders. People should 
play a part in the formulation of policies 
that are to affect their situation. It is 
beyond question that the development of 
modern nations draws from the principles 
of democratic governance because 
political maturity and economic progress 
must go together. The political will of 
Duterte is a good thing, but the Filipino 
people must also embrace the virtues of 
democratic governance and the rule of 
law if the country must escape from the 
ills of the past. The Filipino people cannot 
just rely on outside help because in the 
first place, it is foreign rule that has 
bedeviled this society and cemented the 
latent and obvious moral and hegemonic 
divide among its people. Filipinos must 
face their most pressing political problem 
– the absolute dismantling of a predatory 
state. The way forward is to overhaul a 
corrupt system and empower a people 
who have been deprived of their rights. 
Nothing replaces institutional reforms 
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that are truly grounded in democratic 
principles. 
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